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POST-PETITION TRADING IN CHAPTER 11 CLAIMS: A CALL
FOR AUGMENTATION OF FEDERAL RULE OF
BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE 3001(e)(2)
INTRODUCTION
During the trading mania of the last decade everything was for sale,

even claims against bankrupt companies.' Because bankruptcy has be-2
come a more prevalent and accepted means of financial restructuring,
trading in claims against insolvent companies has emerged as a profitable
activity for investors and a common feature of chapter 11 reorganizations.3 Investors purchasing claims4 against chapter 11 debtors create an
1. See C. Fortgang & T. Mayer, Trading Claims and Taking Control of Corporations in Chapter 1I, 15 Annual N.Y.U. Workshop on Bankruptcy and Business Reorganization 1-7 (1989) (unpublished practitioner's guide to legal and business aspects of
acquiring chapter I1 debtors by purchasing claims against them) (on file atFordhamLaw
Review). Claims against companies that have filed for bankruptcy protection have been
actively traded since the 1930's. See id. at 9 (citing Securities and Exchange Commission,
Report on the Study and Investigation of the Work, Activities, Personnel and Functions
and Reorganization Committees 1936-1940). Traditionally, creditors have had a right to
assign their claims during bankruptcy proceedings. See Hollidge v. Colonial Trust Co.,
290 Mass 52, 58, 194 N.E. 711, 713, cert. denied, 296 U.S. 581 (1935).
2. See Taggart, Balance Sheets Aren't.411 That Weak, N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1985,
§ 3, at 2, col. 3; Id., July 29, 1982, at D4, col. 4; Id., Mar. 7, 1982, § 3, at 17, col. 1.
3. See C. Fortgang & T. Mayer, supra note 1, at 1-11; Elliott, The Wonderful World
ofBankruptcy, Institutional Investor, Nov. 1988, at 68. A market for claims held against
bankrupt debtors exists after the debtor has filed for chapter 11 protection, or post-petition, but before a plan of reorganization has been accepted by the voting creditors, or prereorganization. See C. Fortgang & T. Mayer, supra note 1, at 1-7.
Investors have also utilized the pre-reorganization claim market to control post-reorganization debtors. Investment bankers have proposed purchasing the debt of companies
in chapter 11 as a means for acquiring control of those companies. See C. Fortgang & T.
Mayer, supranote I, at 105; FirstBoston ProposesBuying Bonds as a Takeover Technique,
Corp. Fin. Wk., Mar. 28, 1988, at 1.
Since 1979, at least four debtors have been acquired through or in connection with
post-petition claims purchases. See, eg., In re Apex Oil Co., 92 Bankr. 847, 849 (E.D.
Mo. 1988) (Apex Oil Corp. acquired company jointly owned by Management Group and
Horshman Corporation purchased $545,000,000 in bank debt for $396,000,000, approximately 73 cents on the dollar); In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corporation, Case No.
85-793 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Jan. 15, 1987) (claims purchasers bidding to take control of
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corporation); SEC v. Texas Int'l Co., 498 F. Supp. 1231, 1236
(N.D. Ill. 1980) (King Resources, Inc. reorganized as Phoenix Resources, Inc.); Lipper v.
Texas Int'l Co., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 96,837 (W.D. Okla.
Apr. 6, 1979) (same); Leucadia National Corporation, Inc., filing on Schedule 13D dated
Nov. 28, 1986 (Baldwin United, Inc. reorganized, in parts, as PHLCorp., Inc., when
Leucadia National Corporation acquired 39 percent of the common stock of PHLcorp by
purchasing claims due to receive stock under a confirmed but not consummated plan);
Sandier, Todd's Bondholders Girdfor Battle in Court, Wall St. J., Feb. 23, 1989, at Cl,
col. 2 (claims purchasers bidding for Todd Shipyards Corporation).
For a more in depth discussion of how claims purchases may be used to acquire a
chapter 11 debtor, see generally C. Fortgang & T. Mayer, supra note 1, at chs. 7, 11, and
14.
4. The post-petition market is viable because the assignment of a claim usually transfers all rights and disabilities of that claim from the assignor to the assignee. See Shrop-
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important market that can provide liquidity to cash-starved creditors
5
who cannot wait for confirmation of the reorganization plan.
Bankruptcy courts, however, have been confronted with several
problems coextensive with the rapid growth6 in the claim markets. Of
particular concern has been the lack of disclosure in the chapter 11 postpetition, pre-reorganization market.7 Currently, two provisions impact
on the post-petition claim markets. These provisions, Federal Rule of
Bankruptcy Procedure 3001(e)(2) ("Rule 3001(e)(2)") 8 and section 1125
shire, Woodliff& Co. v. Bush, 204 U.S. 186, 189 (1907); In re Missionary Baptist Found.
of Am., Inc., 667 F.2d 1244, 1246 (5th Cir. 1982); Goldie v. Cox, 130 F.2d 695, 720 (8th
Cir. 1942); In re Dorr Pump & Mfg. Co., 125 F.2d 610, 611 (7th Cir. 1942); In re Stultz
Bros., 226 F. 989, 990 (S.D.N.Y. 1915); In re Zipco, Inc. 157 F. Supp. 675, 677 (S.D. Cal.
1957), aff'd sub nom. Bass v. Shutan, 259 F.2d 561, 563 (9th Cir. 1958). But see Holt v.
FDIC, 868 F.2d 146, 149 (5th Cir. 1989) (debtor could not equitably subordinate bank
claim that FDIC received as insolvent bank's successor merely because bank acted inequitably); SEC v. Albert & Maguire See. Co., 560 F.2d 569, 571-72 (3d Cir. 1977) (coobligor on debt to securities customer was not entitled to customer's priority when it paid
the customer's claim).
The most important consequence of this right of subrogation is that a claim purchased
at a discount may be enforced by the purchaser at par. See In re Moulded Products, Inc.
v. Barry, 474 F.2d 220, 224 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 940 (1973); Kremer V.
Clarke (In re Frank Fehr Brewing Co.), 268 F.2d 170, 180 (6th Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
362 U.S. 963 (1960); Lorraine Castle Apartments Bldg. Corp. v. Machiewich, 149 F.2d
55, 57 (7th Cir.) cert. den., 326 U.S. 728 (1945); In re Automatic Equip. Mfg. Co., 106 F.
Supp. 699, 706-08 (D. Neb. 1952), appeal dismissed, 202 F.2d 955 (8th Cir. 1953).
Therefore, a 50-cent reorganization plan will distribute, or pay-out, 50 cents on a claim
with a face value of $1, even if the claim is held by a post-petition investor who paid 20
cents for it. See C. Fortgang & T. Mayer, supra note 1, at 18 (citing Lorraine Castle
Apartments, 149 F.2d at 57); see also In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 100 Bankr. 241, 242
(W.D. Pa. 1988) ("We were especially concerned because the plan of reorganization
pending at the time of our opinion proposed to pay many of the assignors 100% of their
claims,").
5. See, eg., In re Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 58 Bankr. 1, 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(Revere was in bankruptcy for more than two and a half years before it achieved confirmation of its plan of reorganization); UNR Industries,Inc andSubsidiariesFileReorganization Plan, P.R. Newswire, July 7, 1988 (Business Desk) (UNR commenced its chapter
11 case in July 1982 and still has not consummated a plan).
A variety of post-petition debt has been traded, including privately placed debt securities, bank loan claims, trade claims, personal injury claims and damages for breach of
contract actions. In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corporation, Case No. 85-793 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. Jan. 15, 1987); C. Fortgang & T. Mayer, supra note 1, at 3-4.
6. See, eg., DeMaria, An Overemphasison Bankruptcies,N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1989,
at D2, col. 3 (brokerage firms broadening their efforts to participate in post-petition markets); Farrell, Carson & Schiller, The Vulture Capitalistsare Circling, Bus. Wk., Sept. 5,
1988, at 84-87 (same); Kohn, First Boston Proposes Buying Bonds as a Takeover Technique, Corporate Financing Wk., Mar. 28, 1988, vol. X1Y, No. 12, at 1 (same); Martin,
The None Too GentleArt of theBankruptcy Boys, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1988, at D1, col. 4

(same).

7. See, ag., In re Chateaugay (In re LTV Energy Products), No. 86 B 227342-405
slip. op., (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 1988) (court was concerned that major post-petition
solicitation for claims constituted solicitation on plan without proper disclosure); In re
Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 100 Bankr. 241, 243 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (same).
8. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(e)(2) (1987). This Rule requires filing of notice of the
assignment with the court clerk. It traditionally has been ministerial in application. See
infra notes 34-43 and accompanying text.
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of the Bankruptcy Code9 , however, do not adequately address this lack
of disclosure. These regulatory inadequacies have led to increasing inter-

vention by courts in the market.1" Judicial meddling has resulted in inconsistent decisions and ad hoe remedies that could damage the

reliability of the claim market. II

Part I of this Note describes the mechanics of the post-petition, prereorganization chapter 11 claim market. Part I argues that existing legislation, rules and case law do not sufficiently regulate the modem postpetition claim market. Part III discusses recent decisions that have addressed the lack of disclosure in the post-petition market. Part IV of this

Note establishes a framework for augmenting Rule 3001(e)(2). This
Note concludes that increased disclosure, achieved through an amended
Rule 3001(e)(2), coupled with limitations on judicial discretion, will stabilize the post-petition claim market while addressing recent judicial calls
for disclosure.
I. BACKGROUND: WHY WOULD ANYBODY WANT TO BUY CLAIMs
AGAINST A BANKRUPT COMPANY?

A.

The Mechanics of Trading Chapter 11 Claims

Claims against bankrupt companies are "traded" by assignment.12 An
investor solicits creditors of a bankrupt company to assign their claims at
a certain percentage of face value. 3

Post-petition claim markets rest on the willingness of the investor to
incur two risks. First, the post-petition investor gambles that the reorganization plan will pay creditors more than what the investor paid for
9. See 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (1988). Section 1125(b) requires that all claim holders be
provided with adequate information before being solicited for an acceptance or a rejection
of a plan. See infra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 47-83 and accompanying text.
11. See In re Chateaugay (In re LTV Energy Products), No. 86 B 227342-405, slip
op., (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 1988); In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 100 Bankr. 241, 243
(W.D. Pa. 1988); In re Revere Copper and Brass, Inc., 58 Bankr. 1, 2-3 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
12. See, e.g., ChateaugayNo. 86 B 227342-405, slip op. (assignee of over 450 claims
sought to have assignments approved); Allegheny, 100 Bankr. at 241-42 (assignee sought
approval for claims); Revere, 58 Bankr. at 2 (assignee of claims against chapter 11 debtor
sought to have assignments approved).
13. In In re Chateaugay Corporation, for example, the investor wrote creditors of
LTV Corporation the following notarized solicitation,
Gentlemen:
Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Incorporated represents interests willing to
pay cash for your valid unsecured trade claim in bankruptcy against LTV Corporation and related subsidiaries. The current offer is .15 on each $1.00 of unpaid claims of $20,000 or more.
There is currently no reorganization plan proposed by the company or creditors. If and when there is, claimants may or may not have an opportunity for
higher recoveries.
Supplement to the Requirements of Fed. . Bankr. P. 3001(e)(2), (Lifland, CJ.) (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. May 1, 1989) (No. 86 B 11276); see also Revere, 58 Bankr. at 1-2 (post-petition
investor utilized a written offer to solicit claims).
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the claim. 14 Second, the post-petition investor gambles that a reorganization plan will be confirmed before the cost of carrying the investmentthe time value of money-consumes whatever profit the investor hopes to
make on the discount.15
B. Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code
The present bankruptcy code was enacted by Congress in 1978.16 It
was enacted principally to consolidate older bankruptcy laws,17 deal with
the rising tide of consumer credit since World War IIV8 and to establish
a more comprehensive system of bankruptcy courts. 19
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code20 seeks to enable businesses to
14. See C. Fortgang & T. Mayer, supra note 1, at 6.
15. See id. For example, if a post-petition investor, wanting a 20-percent return,
bought claims four years prior to plan consummation the investor would have to double
its investment under the plan. See id. at 6-7.
In the Revere case, for example, the investor, Phoenix Capital, solicited assignments
from Revere's creditors at "twenty percent (20%) of the face amount of any valid, uncontested and unpaid claim." Revere, 58 Bankr. at 1 (quoting Letter Solicitations made by
Phoenix Capital from November 5 to December 6, 1984 to Revere's creditors). In the
November 30, 1984, edition of The Wall Street Journal, Revere Corporation announced
that in the upcoming plan of reorganization creditor's would have three options: 65 percent cash; 60 percent cash plus 10 percent of their claim in Revere common stock; 39
percent cash, 46 percent in notes and 15 percent of the claim value in Revere common
stock. Id at 2 (citing Wall St. J., Nov. 30, 1984, at 10, col. 1). If these assignments had
been approved by the court, Phoenix stood to make at least a 200-percent return on its
investment in these post-petition claims. See id.
16. See Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549. The 1978 statute--often referred to as the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978--became effective for cases filed after October 1, 1979.
See G. Treister, J.R. Trost, L. Forman, K. Klee, and R. Levin, Fundamentals of Bankruptcy Law 1-7 (1986) [hereinafter G. Treister, BankruptcyLaw]. The 1978 Act replaced
the former 1898 Bankruptcy Act. Id. See generally K. Klee, Legislative History of the
New Bankruptcy Code, 54 Am. Bankr. L.J. 275 (1980) (in-depth discussion of legislative
history of Bankruptcy Code). Title 11 of the United States Code governs liquidation and
rehabilitation cases. See G. Treister, Bankruptcy Law, supra, at 15-17.
Congress left most procedural details for the Supreme Court to supply pursuant to its
rule-making power. See id. The bankruptcy rule-making statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2075
(1987), enables the Supreme Court to provide rules for practice and procedure in bankruptcy. See G. Treister, Bankruptcy Law, supra, at 19. If Congress does not act within
90 days after receiving the rules proposed by the judiciary, those rules take effect and
have the force of law as long as they are not inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code or
other statutes. See id at 19-20.
17. See K. Klee, supra note 16, at 275-80.
18. See G. Treister, Bankruptcy Law, supra note 16, at 3.
19. See id. at 3-7; K. Klee, supra note 16, at 285, 289-91.
20. As enacted in 1938, Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act required that a reorganization plan be in the best interests of creditors, as well as being fair, equitable and feasible.
See Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, Report, H.R. Doe. No.
93-137, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 245 n. 19 [hereinafter Commission Report]. It was
determined that because most chapter 11 cases involved voluntary petitions, the debtor
would remain in possession of the bankrupt. See 5 Collier on Bankruptcy, IJ125.02, at
1125-8 (1989) (citing Commission Report, supra,at 249-50 n.1). Therefore, the absence of
a disinterested trustee in voluntary chapter 11 cases mandated additional protection of
creditors' best interests. See id. In 1952, Congress amended chapter 11 repealing the
"fair and equitable" standard established fourteen years earlier. See id. at 1125-9 to

1990]

POST-PETITION TRADING

1057

rehabilitate themselves as going concerns. 2 Creditors of a chapter 11
corporation have significant influence over the management of the bankrupt.22 In fact, post-petition creditors holding significant claims against
the bankrupt 2 may be able to control the corporation after
reorganization. 3

1125-10. In 1978, chapters 10, 11, and 12 of the Act were consolidated into a single
reorganization chapter. See Id. at 1125-13 (citing 124 Cong. Rec. H11,101 (daily ed.
Sept. 28, 1978); 124 Cong. Rec. S17,418 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978)). A goal of this consolidation was to ensure adequate disclosure. See id. %1125.02, at 1125-13 to 1125-14. The
House report states:
The premise underlying the consolidated chapter 11 of this bill is the same as
the premise of the securities law. If adequate disclosure is provided to all creditors... whose rights are to be affected, then they should be able to make an
informed judgment of their own, rather than having the court... inform them
in advance of whether the proposed plan is a good plan.
Id. 1125-14 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 226 (1977)).
21. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527 (1984); United States v.
Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983); H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
220 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5963, 6179; G. Treister,
supra note 16, at 17.
22. The Supreme Court has observed that, "o]ne of the painful facts of bankruptcy is
that the interests of shareholders become subordinated to the interests of creditors."
CFTC v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 355 (1985). As early as 1881 the courts recognized
that, "the object of the whole [bankruptcy] proceeding is the preservation of the property
for the benefit of the creditors." Taylor v. The Philadelphia & Reading R.R. Co., 7 F.
381, 385 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1881).
Section 1102 of the Bankruptcy Code directs the bankruptcy court to appoint a committee of unsecured creditors, in the absence of a pre-petition creditors committee, "[a]s
soon as practicable after the order for relief." 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (1988). According
to section 1102(b), the creditor's committee is ordinarily to be made up of the seven
largest creditors willing to serve. See id. at § 1102(b) (1988). Pursuant to section
1103(c), the creditors' committee has five specific powers over the formulation of the
chapter 11 plan of reorganization. See id. at § 1103(c) (1988). These enumerated powers
enable the creditor to consult with the trustee or the debtor in possession concerning the
administration of the case, investigate the debtor's acts and financial condition, participate in the formulation of the reorganization plan, request appointment of a trustee and
"perform such other services as are in the interest of those represented." See id. at
§ 1103(c)(5) (1988).
Section 1121 says that only the debtor has the right to file a plan and obtain creditor
preferences until "after 120 days after the date of the order for relief." Id. at § 1121(b)
(1988). However, any "party in interest" including the trustee, the debtor in possession,
a creditor, and the creditors' committee may file a plan of reorganization if:
(1) a trustee has been appointed under [chapter 1];
(2) the debtor has not filed a plan before 120 days after the date of the order
for relief under this chapter; or
(3) the debtor has not filed a plan that has been accepted, before 180 days
after the date of the order for relief under this chapter, by each class of claims
or interests that is impaired under the plan.
Id. at § 1121(c) (1988).
Section 1103(c)(3) mandates that no matter who actually files the plan of reorganization, the creditors' committees may "participate in the formulation of [the] plan, advise
those represented by such committee of such committee's determinations as to any plan
formulated, and collect and file with the court acceptances or rejections of [the] plan."
Id. § 1103(c)(3) (1988).
23. Section 1126(c) gives any creditor which holds two-thirds of the dollar amount of
the debt and a majority of the numerical votes in a class effective control of that class.
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Sections 1121 through 1129 of chapter 1I address the formulation and
confirmation of reorganization plans for the debtor.24 These provisions
create a flexible framework that allows debtors to restructure outstanding
debt. 25 Restructuring, however, requires the consent of the creditors.26
Chapter 11 was designed to ensure that creditors receive adequate disclosure before they vote on a proposed plan.2 7
II.

DEFINING THE PROBLEM

A. Section 1125(b)
In passing section 1125(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, Congress was concerned not that the creditors' votes were based on misinformation, but

that they were based on no information at all.28 Section 1125(b) requires
that "adequate information" be furnished to creditors of a chapter 11
debtor.2 9 This information must be furnished before the creditors are
See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (1988); S. Rep. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 122 (1978),

reprintedin 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5787, 5909. Control of either one-dollar amount or votes-places a negative veto power in the hands of the entity which
has such control. See 5 Collier on Bankruptcy, 11126.03, at 1126-12 (1989). For example, a creditor who has two-thirds of the dollar amount of the claims held against the
debtor (in all classes of debt) yet does not have one half of the votes will still be able to
veto any plan of reorganization that it does not agree with, even though it does not control a majority of the votes. See In re Pine Lake Village Apartment Co., 19 Bankr. 819,
829-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). This is important to the analysis of the trade in bankruptcy
claims because purchasers of multiple claims within a class are counted as having only
one vote in that class. See In re Latham Lithographic Corp., 107 F.2d 749, 751 (2d Cir.
1939).
Therefore, control of at least two thirds of the dollar amount of all classes of debt held
against the bankrupt means control of the reorganization plan. See, ag., In re Apex Oil
Co., 92 Bankr. 847 (E.D. Mo. 1988) (Apex Oil, company in chapter 11 reorganization,
was taken over when company jointly owned by the Management Group and Horshman
Corporation purchased $545,000,000 in bank debt for $396,000,000, thereby gaining control of reorganization plan); Leucadia National Corporation, Inc., filing on Schedule 13D
dated Nov. 28, 1986 (Baldwin-United Corp. was reorganized, in parts, as PHLCorp, Inc.,
when Leucadia acquired 39 percent of common stock of PHLCorp by purchasing claims
due to receive stock under plan that had been confirmed but not yet consummated).
24. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1121-1129 (1988); G. Treister, supra note 16, at 359.
25. See G. Treister, supra note 16, at 359.
26. See 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (1988). There are instances in which not all creditors will be
consulted on the plan, and when a plan proponent may have the power to "cram down" a
plan on dissenting classes of impaired creditors. For an in-depth discussion of cram
down, see Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 Am. Bankr. L.. 133 (1979).
27. See 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b) (1988).
28. See H.Rep. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 225, reprinted in 1978 U.S Code Cong. &
Admin. News 5963, 6185.
29. See 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b) (1988); 5 Collier on Bankruptcy, 11125.03, at 1125-23.
"Adequate information" means information in sufficient detail to enable a reasonable
investor to make an informed judgment about the plan of reorganization. See In re Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 58 Bankr. 1, 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); 11 U.S.C § 1125(a)(1) (1988);
5 Collieron Bankruptcy, 111125.03, at 1125-20 to 1125-23. The type of information that
will constitute adequate information in any particular instance will be assessed on a case-
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solicited to confirm a reorganization plan.3 Section 1125, therefore, af-

fords the solicited creditor at least a minimum amount of information.?
The chapter 11 claim market, however, operates before a plan of reorganization has been confirmed.3" Section 1125 on its face, therefore, does
33
not impact on the post-petition assignment of claims in bankruptcy.
B. Rule 3001(e)(2)
Bankruptcy Rule 3001(e)(2) 34 governs the assignment of claims after
proof of the claims has been filed with the court.35 In its present form,
Rule 3001(e)(2) requires only that the court be notified when a claim is
assigned.3 6 Upon such filing, the court clerk must mail notice of the asby-case basis. See H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 409 (1977), reprintedin 1978
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, 5963, 6365.
30. See 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b) (1988).
31. See S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 121, reprintedin 1978 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 5787, 5907. "A plan is necessarily predicated on knowledge of the assets
and liabilities being dealt with an[sic] on factually supported expectations as to the future
course of the business.... ." Id; see also Century Glove, Inc. v. First Am. Bank, 860 F.2d
94, 100 (3d Cir. 1988) (section 1125 sets floor of disclosure that is to accompany solicitation for approval of plan of reorganization).
32. See In re Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 58 Bankr. 1, 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); C. Fortgang and T. Mayer, supra note 1, at chs. I & 7.
33. See Revere, 58 Bankr. at 3 n.2. Judge Abram stated: "[n]othing in this opinion
should be construed to hold that a disclosure statement as contemplated by Code § 1125
is required before [the claim assignee] may buy claims." Id.
Section 1125(b), however, may prohibit the debtorfrom profiting from pre-reorganization trading in its own claims without providing "adequate information." See In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 100 Bankr. 241, 243 (W.D. Pa. 1988); In re U.S. Truck Co., Inc., 42
Bankr. 787, 778-82 (E.D. Mich. 1984), vacated, 49 Bankr. 604 (E.D. Mich. 1985); In re
Braniff Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d 935, 937 (5th Cir. 1983). It may be argued that a debtor's
solicitation for claims against itself prior to confirmation of a plan has the same operative
effect on those creditors as solicitation for acceptance of a plan. See C. Fortgang & T.
Mayer, supra note 1, at 57-58. In the eyes of the creditor, the debtor is offering to settle
his claim. Some courts have noted, therefore, that discount offers for claims made by the
debtor in possession constitute an unlawful pre-reorganization solicitation that lacks the
requisite section 1125(b) disclosure. See, eg., Allegheny, 100 Bankr. 241, 243 ("Simply
stated, the Bankruptcy Code does not permit a debtor to pay its pre-petition debts to
suppliers, at a discount or otherwise, before confirmation of the plan .... "');U.S. Truck
Co., 42 Bankr. at 789 (debtor, before filing a plan, solicited its creditors to assign a majority of the claims held against it to an affiliate for 40 percent of face value).
34. Rule 3001(e)(2) states:
If a claim other than one based on a bond or debenture has been unconditionally transferred after the proof of claim has been filed, evidence of the terms of
the transfer shall be filed by the transferee. The clerk shall immediately notify
the original claimant ... of the filing of the evidence of transfer and that objection thereto, if any, must be filed with the clerk within 20 days of the mailing of
the notice .... If the court finds, after a hearing on notice, that the claim has
been unconditionally transferred, it shall enter an order substituting the transferee for the original claimant, otherwise the court shall enter such order as may
be appropriate.
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(e)(2).
35. See Id.; infra note 37 and accompanying text.
36. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(e)(2).
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signment to the assignor.3 7 Rule 3001(e)(2) authorizes a hearing on notice without preceding request or suggestion from either party to the
assignment.3
The only issue to be resolved in a 3001(e)(2) hearing is whether the
transfer of the claim in interest is unconditional: "[i]f the court finds...
that the claim has been unconditionally transferred, it shall enter an order substituting the transferee for the original claimant .... 9,39
In the past, courts found that Rule 3001(e)(2) served the interests of
sound administration by limiting trading on inside information and trading by fiduciaries of the debtor."° Recently, however, bankruptcy decisions have recognized that 3001(e)(2) does not provide adequate
disclosure.4 1
The Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules
has proposed certain amendments to Rule 3001(e).4 2 These proposed
37. See id. Until recently, assignments of claims were processed through a ministerial
procedure that did not entail judicial scrutiny. See, eg., In re Quakertown Shopping
Center, Inc., 366 F.2d 95, 98 (3d Cir. 1966) (creditor could transfer its claim against
debtor without court approval); C. Fortgang & T. Mayer, supra note 1, at 29 (description
of 3001(e)(2) as traditionally ministerial in purpose and application). But see, eg., In re
Chateaugay (In re LTV Energy Products), No. 86 B 227342-405, slip. op. (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 1988) (court used Rule 3001(e)(2) "hearing" power to interrupt postpetition transfers); In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 100 Bankr. 241, 243 (W.D. Pa. 1988)
(same); In re Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 58 Bankr. 1, 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (same).
38. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(e)(2); see also Revere, 58 Bankr. at 2-3 (court used
Rule 3001(e)(2) "hearing power" to interrupt post-petition claim assignments); Allegheny, 100 Bankr. at 243 (same). Because Rule 3001(e)(2) does not require court approval of any claim assignment based upon a bond or debenture, it can only be used to
protect creditors other than public security holders. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(e)(2); see
also In re Apex Oil Co., 92 Bankr. 847, 863 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1988) (Rule 3001(e)(2)
does not require court approval of any claim based upon bond or debenture).
39. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(e)(2).
40. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(e)(2) advisory committee's note; cf. Monroe v.
Scofield, 135 F.2d 725, 726-27 (10th Cir. 1943) (director who purchased claim against
insolvent corporation is precluded from recovering more than what she paid for it); In re
Philadelphia & Western Ry. Co., 64 F. Supp. 738, 740 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (fiduciaries who
purchased claims limited to recovery of price less any profits from other bonds purchased

by them).

41. See In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 100 Bankr. 241, 242 (W.D. Pa. 1988). "[We did
not, and still do not, believe that Rule 3001(e)(2) adequately addressed our concerns."
Id.; see also Supplement to the Requirements of Fed. P. Bankr. P. 3001(e)(2) (Lifland,
C.J.) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 1, 1989) (No. 86 B 11276) [hereinafter Supplement to
3001(e)(2)] (Judge Lifland established chamber rules requiring more significant disclosure
by future trade claim assignees to both court and assignors).
42. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of
the United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Bankruptcy Rules
(August 1989) [hereinafter "Committee ProposaP]. The Committee has requested that
the proposals be circulated to the bench, the bar and to the public generally for comment.
See id. at xiv (Letter from Joseph F. Weis, Jr., Chairman, Standing Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure, and James E. Macklin, Jr., Secretary (August 18, 1989)).
The proposed new Rule 3001(e)(2) reads:
Transfer Other Than ForSecurity After ProofFiled. If a claim other than one
based on a publicly traded bond or debenture has been transferred other than
for security after the proof of claim has been filed, evidence of the transfer shall

1990]

POST-PETITIONTRADING

1061

changes limit the bankruptcy court's role in the administration of claim
transfers without addressing the lack of disclosure in the modem post43
petition claim markets.

III. THE POST-PETITION TRILOGY: RECENT JURISPRUDENCE IN
THE POST-PETITION MARKET
Without regulation that specifically addresses inadequate disclosure,
the chapter 11 claims market will continue to operate without the information necessary to ensure a fair and free marketplace. 44 Rule
3001(e)(2) requires nothing more than filing of notification by the assignee and an assignor acknowledgement of the claim transfer with the
court.4 5 Section 1125(b), on its face, is limited to solicitations for votes
on proposed plans of reorganization. 4 6 Courts, however, have attempted
to fill this void with their own ad hoe remedies, which has caused uncertainty in the post-petition market.
Three recent cases have confronted the issue of disclosure in post-petition claim market.47 Each involved attempts by investors to have postpetition assignments approved pursuant to Rule 3001(e)(2). All three
were brought before the court without any preceding request or suggestion from the claim assignor. Although the facts in each were strikingly
similar, the results varied.48
The court in In re Revere Copper andBrass, Inc. 49 was concerned that
be flied by the transferee. The clerk shall immediately notify the alleged transferor by mail of the filing of the evidence of transfer and that objection thereto,
if any, must be filed within 20 days of the mailing of the notice or within any
additional time allowed by the court. If the alleged transferor files a timely
objection and the court finds, after notice and a hearing, that the claim has been
transferred other than for security, it shall enter a order substituting the transferee for the transferor. If a timely objection is not filed by the alleged transferor, the transferee shall be substituted for the transferor.
Id. at 77-78 (emphasis omitted).
43. See id. at 80-81. Even though the amended rule is meant to have a neutral effect
on post-petition trading, the proposal seems to have been sparked by recent judicial interruptions of chapter 11 claim transfers where there was no preceding assignor objection.
See In re Chateaugay (In re LTV Energy Products), No. 86 B 227342-405 slip op.,
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 1988); In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 100 Bankr. 241, 243 (W.D.
Pa. 1988); In re Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 58 Bankr. 1, 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); see also
Committee Proposal,supra note 42, at xxv ("Rule 3001 is amended to limit the court's
role in connection with transfers of claims.").
44. The best way to ensure that a market operates efficiently and freely is to provide
the marketplace with as much pertinent information as possible without chilling it with
undue regulation. See C. Fortgang & T. Mayer, supra note 1, at 75-76.
45. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(e)(2).
46. See 5 Collier on Bankruptcy 11125.03(2), at 1125-23.
47. See In re Chateaugay (In re LTV Energy Products), No. 86 B 227342-405 slip op.
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 1988); In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 100 Bankr. 241 (W.D. Pa.
1988); In re Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 58 Bankr. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
48. See Chateaugay, No. 227342-405, slip. op.; Allegheny, 100 Bankr. at 242-43; Revere, 58 Bankr. at 2-3.
49. 58 Bankr. I (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Revere concerned the assignment of 28 claims
against Revere, a chapter 11 debtor, to a third party investor. See id. at 1. Revere peti-
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post-petition claim assignors had been too eager to sell their claims at
steep discounts and may have done so without adequate information.5 0
Judge Abram also sensed that the claim assignee ('Thoenix") stood to
make an extremely large profit.5
Revere addressed the problem of inadequate disclosure by allowing
claimants thirty days to rescind their assignments before approving the
transfers. 2 Judge Abram stated that subsequent claim assignments to
Phoenix would not be approved unless the claimants were advised of the
pertinent terms of Revere's reorganization plan. 3
Judge Abram suggested that section 1125 should extend to third-party
claims purchases.5 4 In a footnote, however, she stated, "[n]othing in this
tioned for chapter 11 protection on October 27, 1982. Beginning on November 5, 1984
Phoenix Capital Corporation ("Phoenix") sent out letters to Reveres creditors, soliciting
them to sell their claims for "twenty percent (20%) of the face amount of any valid,
uncontested and unpaid claim." Id. at 1 (quoting Phoenix's letter of solicitation). The
court was unaware of any relationship between Phoenix and Revere. Id. at 2.
All the solicitations were sent out between November 5 and December 6, 1984. In
eleven cases, Phoenix tendered payment to the "assignor-claimant" prior to November
29, 1984. In the rest of the 17 cases, Phoenix tendered payment between December 3,
1984 and January 15, 1985. On November 30, 1984 the Wall Street Journal published an
article, based on an announcement by Revere, outlining the details of a plan of reorganization. See id. at 2.
Pursuant to the requirements of Rule 3001(e)(2), Phoenix filed notice of the assignments with the bankruptcy court clerk. See id. at 1. For discussion of Rule 3001(e)(2)
requirements, see supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text. On February 13, 1985 the
clerk's office sent "standard" form notice to the assignor-claimants that the assignments
and requests for subrogation had been filed by Phoenix, and advised them that the court
would enter an order of subrogation unless an objection was entered by the assignorclaimant on or before March 5, 1985. See Revere, 58 Bankr. at I (citing Fed. L Bankr.
P. 3001(e)(2)). No objections were filed. The Court considered this case pursuant to its
authority under Rule 3001(e)(2) without preceding objection from either party to the
assignment. See id. at 2-3.
50. See id. at 2. Judge Abram stated:
One of the evils attendant upon a solicitation of assignment of claims for a cash
payment such as is being made by Phoenix is that solicited creditors may be
unaware of their rights and options and fall prey to the belief that bankruptcy
inevitably will result in their receiving the proverbial 10 cents on the dollar or
worse.
Id.
Judge Abram expressed this concern even though seventeen of the twenty-eight assignments came after the November 30 Wall Street Journal article outlining terms of Reveres
proposed plan. See id. (citing Wall St. J., Nov. 30, 1984, at 10, col. 1).
51. Cf.id. at 2-3 (court worried that assignees may profit from creditors' ignorance of
the bankruptcy process and lack of adequate information).
52. See id. at 3.
53. See id.
54. Judge Abram implicates section 1125's relevance to post-petition solicitations by
third party investors when, in the body of the opinion, she describes section 1125's disclosure requirements and goes on to observe that the assignors in this case were not provided
with enough disclosure. Judge Abram stated:
Bankruptcy Code § 1125 prohibits solicitation of acceptances or rejections of a
filed plan unless the solicitation is accompanied or preceded by a disclosure
statement. The disclosure statement must contain adequate information ....
The assignor-claimant [sic] have not been shown to been given [sic] sufficient
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opinion should be construed to hold that a disclosure statement as contemplated by Code § 1125 is required before Phoenix may buy
claims." 55 Notwithstanding Judge Abram's disclaimer, Revere rests on a
broad interpretation of section 1125(b). 6 Revere, if not limited, would
classify claims purchases by third-party investors as solicitations on a
plan of reorganization. 57
The Phoenix claims purchases were, however, in no way connected
with such a plan. Phoenix, a third-party investor, simply sought to speculate on the outcome of the reorganization.5" Furthermore, this broad
interpretation is contrary to recent case law that has narrowed the application of section 1125(b) and limited the definition of what constitutes a
solicitation on a plan.59
Judge Cosetti in In re Allegheny International,Inc.,°'also addressed
the disclosure problem. In a memorandum opinion, Judge Cosetti di-

rected investors who had purchased claims at a discount to offer the
claim assignors a chance to rescind their assignments.6 1 Upon motions

information by Phoenix that they might make an informed judgment about the
offer made to them.
Id. at 2-3. (footnote omitted).
55. Id. at 3 n.2. Judge Abram noted that her decision was concerned only with ensuring that overreaching is not overlooked by the ministerial task of approving assignments
pursuant to 3001(e)(2). See id.
56. See id. at 3; see also In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 100 Bankr. 241, 242 (W.D. Pa.
1988) (citing In re Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. 58 Bankr. 1 ($.D.N.Y. 1985) (the Allegheny court also took a broad view of § 1125(b)); C. Fortgang & T. Mayer, supra note 1,
at 55 ("there was little or no authority either under the Code or even under the Act for
the rescission of [Phoenix's] purchases").
57. See In re Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 58 Bankr. 1, 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
58. See Allegheny, 100 Bankr. at 242 n.3; Revere, 58 Bankr. at 2; supra note 15 and
accompanying text.
59. See, eg., Century Glove, Inc. v. First American Bank, 860 F.2d 94, 101-02 (3d
Cir. 1988) (intercreditor communications about alternate plans are not subject to section
1125); TWA v. Texaco (In re Texaco), 81 Bankr. 813, 815 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (agreement to
settle Pennzoil's suit for $3 billion in return for Pennzoil's support for debtor's plan did
not constitute solicitation of acceptance).
60. 100 Bankr. 241 (W.D. Pa. 1988). In Allegheny, Phoenix Capital, Drexel Burnham Lambert, Cowen & Co., and Al Investment Partners, L.P., purchased claims at a
discount from the original creditors of Allegheny, International. See id. at 242. The
discounts offered in the various solicitations ranged from Phoenix's 20 percent of face
value to Cowen & Co.'s 75 percent of face value. See id. at 243. Judge Cosetti noted that
the assignors (i.e. Pittsburgh National Bank) were sophisticated financial institutions who
understood the implications of their actions. See id. at 242. Nevertheless, upon learning
that Allegheny had filed a 100-cent plan, Judge Cosetti ordered third party investors to
allow the claim sellers to rescind their assignments. See id. at 243 (citing Memorandum
Opinion and Order of November 3, 1988). Here, as in Revere, the court acted on its own
initiative. There were no preceding objections from any of the claim assignors. See id. at
243. judge Cosetti stated "[w]e were especially concerned because the plan of reorganization pending at the time of our opinion proposed to pay many of the assignors 100% of
their claims." Id. at 242.
In December of 1988 the investors motioned Judge Cosetti to reconsider his November
decision. Cosetti granted the motions for reconsideration, and held that assignments
would be approved pursuant to normal Rule 3001(e)(2) procedure. See id. at 242.
61. See id at 242.
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for reconsideration, the Judge reversed his order and approved the assignments6 2 Approval was conditioned upon an order requiring future
debtors to provide potential assignors with information regarding the
6
value of the claims.
The reasoning in Allegheny and Revere was
similar."
Allegheny applied section 1125(b) broadly and adopted an expansive
view of what constitutes a solicitation on a plan." Allegheny is not clear,
however, as to whether section 1125(b) actually applies to claim assignments where the assignee is an unrelated third-party investor.66 Judge
Cosetti acknowledged that if the solicitations had been made not by
third-party investors, but by the debtor itself, the court would be forced
to apply section 1125(b) disclosure requirements to the transaction.6
Yet the decision recognized that section 1125(b), as written, does not
apply to chapter 11 claim assignments to third party investors.6 8
Allegheny suggests that, if given the chance, some bankruptcy judges
would apply section 1125(b) disclosure to third-party dealings in claim
markets.69 Judge Cosetti called for new legislation in this area.7"
Judge Cosetti established an informal supplement to Rule 3001(e)(2)71
to regulate future claim assignments.72 It required potential assignees to
62. See id. at 244.
63. See id. at 243.
64. Judge Cosetti stated that "[i]dentical concerns and a similar remedy were expressed by the court in In re Revere." See id. at 242. Both Judge Cosetti and Judge
Abram were concerned that, because of a lack of adequate disclosure, creditors were
selling their claims at steep discounts, without fully understanding their rights. See id. at
242 (citing In re Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. 58 Bankr. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)).
65. See id. at 243. Judge Cosetti stated: "Section 1125(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, I1
U.S.C. § 1125(b), prohibits solicitation before a disclosure statement has been disseminated. We remain troubled that the process by which claims are solicited constitutes
solicitation, but does not provide even a minimum of information." Id.
66. See id. at 243; see also In re Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 58 Bankr. 1, 3 n.2
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (Judge Abram also stated that post-petition claims purchases by the
debtor would require section 1125(b) disclosure).
67. See Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 100 Bankr. 241, 243 (W.D. Pa. 1988).
68. Judge Cosetti said:
the Bankruptcy Code does not permit a debtor to pay its pre-petition debts to
suppliers, at a discount or otherwise, before confirmation of the plan, but it
appears to allow third parties to purchase the claims of those suppliers at discounts, which are sometimes outrageous, without any disclosure.
Id. at 243.
This is in line with present case law which has sought to avoid broadening the scope of
section 1125(b). See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
69. Cf Allegheny, 100 Bankr. at 243 (court suggests the application of section 1125
disclosure to post-petition solicitations by third-party investors).
70. "We hope that Congress will address these concerns in the future." Id. at 243.
71. Even though Allegheny seems to call for an extension of the traditional application of section 1125(b), it ultimately relies on Rule 3001(e)(2) to impose extra disclosure
requirements. See id. at 243-44. This seems to suggest that the answer to any disclosure
problems lies not in section 1125(b), but in Rule 3001(e)(2).
72. CompareAllegheny, 100 Bankr. at 243-44 ("Prospective assignments will require
compliance with Bankruptcy Rule 3001(e)(2), as modified by this order.") with In re
Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 58 Bankr. 1, 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("Phoenix is advised that as
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give notice of the transfer not only to the court and to the assignor, but
also to the debtor. The debtor would then have to provide the claim

assignor with its best estimate of the claim's value.73 The onus of disclosure would fall not on the investor-assignee,74 but on the debtor in
possession."

In In re Chateaugay(In re LTV Energy Products),76 Regal Inc.sought
to acquire control of LTV Energy Products, a chapter 11 debtor and a
subsidiary of the LTV Corporation. 7 7 Notwithstanding Regal's objections, Judge Lifland and the debtor surmised that Regal's post-petition

solicitation for claims was a vehicle for the acquisition.78

to any claims assigned to it that the court will in the future decline to approve the assignments unless ... claimants have been advised... of the pertinent terms of Revere's
announced or any subsequently filed plan.").
73. See Allegheny, 100 Bankr. at 243-44.
74. See Id. at 243-44.
75. See Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 100 Bankr. 241, 243-44 (W.D. Pa. 1988). Unlike Revere, Allegheny shifted the burden of disclosure onto the debtor in possession. The debtor
would have a better understanding of the value of the claims being solicited for assignment. Compare id. at 243-44 (required debtor to provide assignor with disclosure) with
Revere, 58 Bankr. at 2-3 (required assignee to provide assignor with disclosure statement). Judge Cosetti would interject the debtor, who may not support the assignments,
into a private transaction between the investor and the potential assigning creditor. In

contrast, legislative history indicates that 3001(e)(2) was enacted to require limited dis-

closure from the post-petition transferee, not from the debtor. See Fed. R. Bankr. P.
3001(e)(2) advisory committee's note. More importantly, involving the debtor in postpetition transactions may raise unnecessary conflict of interest problems as well as difficulties in determining exactly what the debtor would be required to disclose.
76. No. 86 B 227342-405, slip. op. (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 1988).
77. See In re Chateaugay (In re LTV Energy Products), No. 86 B 227342-405, slip op.
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. II, 1988); see also Transcript of Hearing on Motion by Regal
Int'l to Reconsider, March 11, 1988, Order Declining to Approve the Transfer of 456
Claims, at 6-7 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 1988) ("Regal has stated unqualifiedly before
this Court on various occasions... that it would like to acquire through formulation and
presentation of a Plan of Reorganization related to LTV Energy Products [sic]" (comments of Mr. Hazan, attorney for Regal, Ine)).
78. See Id. at 7; C. Fortgang & T. Mayer, supra note 1, at 105-08. In Chateaugay,
Regal formed a shell corporation called EPA, Inc., to buy LTV Energy Product's debt.
See C. Fortgang & T. Mayer, supra note 1, at 105. EPA mailed solicitations to every
unsecured creditor of LTV Energy Products, offering 33 cents for every dollar amount of
unliquidated claims held against LTV. See id. Over 456 creditors accepted EPA's cash
offer. EPA duly filed notices of transfer with the bankruptcy clerk for the Southern District of New York, pursuant to 3001(e)(2). See id.; see also Regal's Memorandum of Law
in Support of Motion for Reconsideration at 1-2, In re Chateaugay,No. 86 B 227342-405,
slip op. (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 1988) (Case. Nos. 86 B 11270 through 86 B 11334);
Debtors' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Motion at 2-3, In re Chateaugay,
No. 86 B 227342-405, slip op. (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 1988) (Case Nos. 86 B 11270
through 86 B 11334). LTV Energy Products, however, disagreed with Regal over the
pace of the reorganization and Regal's desire to control the reorganized debtor. LTV
Energy Products, therefore, challenged the assignments. See Chateaugay, No. 86 B
226342-405, slip op.
Unlike Allegheny and Revere, the assignment controversy was pursued, not by the
overseeing bankruptcy judge, but by the debtor. See C. Fortgang &T. Mayer, supra note
1,at 105. It should be noted that even though the debtor, a party in interest, objected to
the assignments, the actual assignors did not. See Regal's Memorandum of Law in Sup-
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Judge Lifland refused to approve the transfers.79 He was concerned
that Regal, by proposing what amounted to a solicitation on a plan without the requisite disclosure, circumvented protections offered creditors
by section 1125.3° Judge Lifland attached a "Chamber Supplement" to
Rule 3001(e)(2) to apply to all future claim assignments.8 1
Judge Lifland did not extend the traditional applications of 1125(b).1 2
He instead opted to augment the bankruptcy rules through a specific
chamber supplement requiring disclosure of the consideration paid for
the claim and representation that the assignment was not solicited by
misinformation. 3
The bankruptcy courts have struggled with regulations and rules that
are inadequate to address the expanding market in post-petition claims.3 4
The response to this problem has been a series of inconsistent and ad hoc
judicial remedies that begs for some regulatory guidance."' The bank-

ruptcy courts have recognized that they are not regulatory mechanics
and that more effective regulation should come from the appropriate
port of Motion for Reconsideration at 2-3, In re Chateaugay, No. 86 B 227342-405, slip
op. (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 1988) (Case Nos. 86 B 11270 through 86 B 11334).
79. Compare Chateaugay,No. 86 B 227342-405, slip op. (court refused approval on
456 post-petition claim assignments) with In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 100 Bankr. 241,
243-44 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (upon reconsideration court approved assignees motion for subrogation) and In re Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 58 Bankr. 1, 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (court
required 30 day rescission period before it would approve assignee's request for subrogation of 28 claims).
80. See C. Fortgang & T. Mayer, supra note 1, at 105-16; see also Transcript of Hearing on Motion by Regal Int'l to Reconsider, March 11, 1988 Order Declining to Approve
the Transfer of 456 Claims 11 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 1988) (No. 967-7707), In re
Chateaugay,No. 86 B 227342-405, slip op. (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. I1, 1988) ("it's 1125
... that is the issue that's really been brought into focus here"). Judge Lifland found that
EPA/Regal had made a wide-ranging cash offer for claims while it simultaneously proposed a plan that would end up paying unsecured creditors---including itself-three times
as much as it had paid to its sellers. See C. Fortgang & T. Mayer, supra note 1, at 105-06.
Judge Lifland was also concerned that Regal failed to make adequate disclosure to the
assignors that EPA was actually a front for Regal, and that Regal desired to obtain control of LTV Energy Products through the purchase of unsecured claims. See id. at 106.
81.
Supplement to the Requirements of Fed R. Bankr. P. 3001(e)(2)
In connection with requests for claimant substitution orders pursuant to Fed.
R. Bankr. P. 3001(e)(2), the following shall be included in the application accompanying each claim assignment order: 1) A statement of the consideration
paid for each assigned claim. 2) A representation that the assignee of the claim
did not solicit the assignor via the use of misinformation.
Supplement to Rule 3001(e)(2), supra note 41.
82. See Transcript of Hearing on Motion by Regal Int'l to Reconsider, March 11,
1988, Order Declining to Approve the Transfer of 456 Claims at 10-11 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 19, 1988) (No. 967-77-07), In re Chateaugay, No. 86 B 227342-405 slip op. (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 1988).
83. See Supplement to Rule 3001(e)(2), supra note 41.
84. See supra notes 47-83 and accompanying text.
85. See In re Chateaugay, No. 86 B 227342-405, slip op. (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988); In
re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 100 Bankr. 241, 243 (W.D. Pa. 1988); In re Revere Copper &
Brass, Inc., 58 Bankr. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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rule-making bodies.8 6 Continued uncertainty in the jurisprudence of
post-petition claim assignments will make the market less attractive to
investors.8 7 Accordingly, it would be more difficult for cash-poor creditors to liquidate their claims. s8 Adoption of supplemented procedures
would provide desperately needed guidance. 9
IV.

RESOLUTION: A CALL FOR AUGmENTATION
OF RULE 3001(E)(2)

A. Disclosure
Bankruptcy decisions have noted that existing regulation fails to pro-

vide for significant disclosure in the post-petition claim markets. 9° Rule
3001(e)(2) should be amended to require certain de minimis levels of disclosure from the post-petition assignee.
Requiring the assignee to divulge the amount paid for the claim91
would notify other interested parties of the claim's trading value. It
would also enable potential assignors to gauge the value of their own
post-petition
claims. This would make the post-petition market more
92

efficient.

The assignee should further represent that the claim was not solicited
through the use of misinformation or omission. This representation
would address recent concerns over possible insider trading in the postpetition market.93 Such a requirement would create an affirmative duty
on the part of the assignor to disclose any information that contradicted
the claim solicitation.
An amendment to 3001(e)(2) should also require that post-petition
claim solicitations include notice to the potential assignors of the possi86. See, e.g., Allegheny, 100 Bankr. at 243 (court asked for legislative guidance); Revere, 58 Bankr. at 3 n.2 (court was reluctant to apply section 1125(b) to post-petition
trading by third-party investors). These rule-making bodies include the Supreme Court,
see 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1988), or the district courts themselves. See Fed. R. Bankr. P.
9029.
87. See Reply and Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, Sept. 12, 1988, at 24, In re Chateaugay, No. 86 B 227342-405 slip op.
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (Case Nos. 86 B 11270 through 86 B 1134 inclusive and 86 B
11402 and 86 B 11464).
88. See id. at 23-25; see alsoAllegheny, 100 Bankr. at 242 (argument of Cowen & Co.
in favor of order of subrogation of assignments).
89. See infra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
90. See In re Chateaugay, No. 86 B 227342-405, slip op. (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988); In
re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 100 Bankr. 241, 243 (W.D. Pa. 1988); In re Revere Copper &
Brass, Inc., 58 Bankr. 1, 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
91. See Supplement to Rule 3001(e)(2), supra note 41.
92. By analogy, Rule 3001(e)(1), which deals with claim transfers before the claim
itself was filed, requires that "evidence of the transfer" shall be supported by "a statement of the transferor acknowledging the transfer and stating the consideration therefor." See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(e)(1); see alsosupra note 44 and accompanying text (the
greater the amount of pertinent disclosure the more efficient the market).
93. See In re Allegheny, 100 Bankr. 241, 243 (W.D. Pa. 1988); Supplement to Rule
3001(e)(2), supra note 41.
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bility of higher yields from reorganization payouts. Such a change would
be a small step toward ensuring that the post-petition assignor had a ba94
sic understanding of the reorganization process.
In addition, 3001(e)(2) should be extended to include a brief period
during which assignors could rescind their claim transfers. This amendment would mollify the pressure assignors face when confronted with
post-petition solicitations offering immediate cash for their claims and
would, therefore, reduce panic selling.9"
Taken together, these proposed amendments to Rule 3001(e)(2) would
address recent judicial calls for increased disclosure in the chapter 11
post-petition
claims market, without unduly burdening the market with
96
regulation.
B. JudicialIntervention Only at the Request or Suggestion of the
Claim Assignor
Augmentation of Rule 3001(e)(2) with stronger disclosure provisions
would make it unnecessary for the courts to intervene in the post-petition
markets in most instances. Adopting such requirements should circumscribe authority of bankruptcy judges to interrupt post-petition assignments randomly without prior request or suggestion by the claim
assignor. The Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Bankruptcy Rules would change Rule 3001(e)(2) to require judicial approval
of post-petition claim assignments unless the assignor filed timely objection with the court.9 7 This would take the bankruptcy court out of the
post-petition assignment process and confine it to its traditional ministerial function of approving claim transfers. 98
94. See, ag., Allegheny, 100 Bankr. at 243 (court was concerned that post-petition
investors may be able to take advantage of their superior knowledge of the chapter I1
process to the detriment of the original claimants); In re Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 58
Bankr. 1, 2-3 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (same).
Some solicitations contained language notifying solicited claimants of higher yields

upon reorganization. See Supplement to Rule 3001(e)(2), supra note 41. The solicitation
from EPA/Regal to creditors of LTV Energy Products stated, "[tihere is currently no
reorganization plan proposed by the company or the creditors. If and when there is
claimants may or may not have an opportunity for higher recoveries." Id. at 6. But see
Revere, 58 Bankr. at 1 (Allegheny's letter provided no such language).
95. The Revere court allowed claim assignors a thirty-day period in which to revoke
their claim transfers. See Revere, 58 Bankr. at 3. As the court further noted: "One of the
evils attendant upon a solicitation of assignment of claims for a cash payment.., is that
solicited creditors may be unaware of their rights and options." Id. at 2; see also Allegheny, 100 Bankr. at 243 (court was concerned that small unsophisticated creditors were
panic selling their claims to more sophisticated post-petition investors).
96. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
97. See Committee Proposal,supra note 42, at 76-81.
98. See, ag., Committee Proposal,supra note 42, at 80-81 advisory committee's note
("Subdivision (e) is amended to limit the court's role to the adjudication of disputes regarding transfers of claims.") (emphasis omitted); see also In re Quakertown Shopping
Center, Inc., 366 F.2d 95, 98 (3d Cir. 1966) (creditor may voluntarily transfer his claim
without approval of bankruptcy court); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(e)(2) advisory committee's note (the intent behind the rule was fundamentally administrative); C. Fortgang &
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This change is necessary to limit the destabilizing effect of the recent
judicial intervention in the post-petition market. 99 Because the parties
usually involved are sophisticated institutional investors and creditors,
such intervention is largely unnecessary." ° Furthermore, the bankruptcy courts' general equitable powers to "issue any order, process, 1or
0
judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions" '
of the Code would not be affected.
CONCLUSION

The post-petition chapter 11 claims market infuses desperately needed
liquidity into a process usually starved for cash. The viability of this
market depends upon the willingness of third party investors to gamble
on the outcome of unpredictable reorganizations. Recent judicial ventures into the post-petition market, precipitated by a lack of adequate
disclosure provisions, resulted in varying remedies. Continued ad hoe
and inconsistent decisions will discourage investors from speculating in
the market for post-petition claims.
Therefore, bankruptcy judges should be given guidance on how to administer this growing market fairly and effectively. Augmentation of
Rule 3001(e)(2), as suggested in this Note, is a logical vehicle for providing such guidance and ensuring consistency and stability in the post-petition market.
Gordon Caplan
T. Mayer, supra note 1, at 26 (Rule 3001(e)(2) imposes relatively innocuous restrictions

on claims trading).
99. Cf.Committee Proposal,supra note 42, at 80-81 advisory committee's note (recommends limiting courts' role in the post-petition assignment process).
100. See In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc. 100 Bankr. 241, 242 (W.D. Pa. 1988); C.Fortgang
&T. Mayer, supranote 1,at 71-72. But see In re Revere Copper &Brass, Inc., 58 Bankr.
I (S.D.N.Y. 1985)(court was concerned that claim assignors were in fact
unsophisticated).
101. 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1982 & Supp. 1987).

